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Gambling with the IRS: The Enforcement of
Retroactive Tax Statutes in United States v.
Carlton

In United States v. Carlton,' the Supreme Court rejected a Due
Process challenge to the retroactive elimination of an estate tax
deduction. In 1986, Congress revised the Internal Revenue Code to
allow a deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 2057 for half the proceeds of a sale
of employer securities by the executor of an estate to an employee stock
ownership plan (ESOP).' Jerry W. Carlton was the executor of
Willametta K. Day's estate.4 In December 1986, Carlton used estate
funds to purchase MCI stock valued at $11,206,000.? Two days later,
Carlton sold the stock to the MCI ESOP for $10,575,000, losing $631,000
in the transaction.8 Carlton filed a timely estate tax return, claiming
a deduction under section 2057 for half the proceeds of the sale of stock,
which amounted to a tax liability reduction of $2,501,161.' In January
1987, the IRS announced it would interpret the deduction to be available
only to estates of decedents who owned the securities immediately before
death In February 1987, a bill was proposed in the House and Senate
to codify the IRS interpretation? On December 22, 1987, the amendment to section 2057 was enacted.1" It provided that in order to qualify
for the deduction, the securities sold to the ESOP must have been
The
"directly owned" by the decedent "immediately before death."
amendment was made effective as if it had been included in the original

1.

114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).

2.
3.

Id. at 2024.
Id. at 2020.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 2021.
Id.
Id.
Id.

8. Id. (citing IRS Notice 87-13, 1987-1 Cum. Bull. 432, 442).

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, § 10411(a), 101 Stat. 1330432).
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statute of October 1986.12 The IRS disallowed Carlton's section 2057
deduction."3 Carlton paid the asserted tax deficiency, plus interest,
filed a claim for a refund, and initiated a refund action in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, claiming that
the retroactive application of the statute violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 4 The parties stipulated that if the statute
could not be retroactively applied without violating the Constitution,
Carlton would be entitled to a refund; else the Government would
prevail. " The court held the tax was not so "unduly harsh and
oppressive" as to violate due process and entered summary judgment for
the United States." The court focused on: (1) whether the statute was
a "wholly new tax" or a rate change in an existing tax; and (2) whether
the change (amendment) was reasonably foreseeable.17 The court found
the statute was simply a "rate change" and the change was foreseeable;
therefore, the amendment did not violate the Due Process Clause."8
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court in a twoto-one decision, using a different test than the district court. 9 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 20 The
Court held retroactive application of a tax statute does not violate the
Due Process Clause if the application of the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate legislative purpose. 1
Retroactive laws are disfavored in the Constitution. The Constitution
provides several restrictions against retroactive application of laws. Ex
Post Facto laws are prohibited. 22 Bills of Attainder, laws that apply to
specific individuals, are prohibited.' The Contract Clause prevents
laws impairing contract obligations, reflecting the Framer's disapproval

12.

Id. Thus, while the amendment to § 2057 was enacted December 22, 1987, the

amendent applied to transactions that occurred after October 1986, including Carlton's sale
of stock to the MCI ESOP.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992), reu'd, 114 S. Ct. 2018
(1994).

1.6.972 F.2d at 1059, 1062. The district court used the standard from Welch v. Henry,
305 U.S. 134 (1938), discussed at infra notes 45-48.
17. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055.

18. Id.
19. Id. The court of appeals framed the test as (1) Whether the taxpayer had actual
or constructive notice that the tax statute would be retroactively amended; and (2) Whether
the taxpayer reasonably relied to his detriment on pre-amendment law.
20. 114 S.Ct. at 2018.
21. Id. at 2024.

22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
23. Id.
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of retroactive laws affecting contracts. 24 The Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment restricts retroactive laws unduly affecting property
rights.25 Most commonly, it is argued that retroactive application of a
statute may violate due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 26
There are many policy reasons for this historical disapproval of
retroactive application of statutes. Citizens should be able to plan their
conduct with reasonable certainty of the legal consequences. There is a
public need for stability with respect to past transactions. Retroactive
laws may be passed with exact knowledge of who the law will benefit or
harm, which increases the potential for corruption in the political
process. Despite these policy arguments, retroactive tax laws were
initially upheld against constitutional challenges. In a 1874 decision,
Stockdale v. Atlantic Insurance Co., the Court upheld a retroactive tax
on corporate dividends as a "legitimate exercise of the taxing power by
which a tax, which might be supposed to have expired, was revived and
continued in existence for two years longer."' Later, in Brushaber v.
Union Pacific Railroad,29 the Court relied on the decision in Stockdale
to uphold another retroactive tax statute.30 The Court stated "the
Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring, upon the one
hand, a taxing power, and taking the same power away, on the other, by
the limitations of the due process clause."31 Despite these holdings, in
the early 1900s, the Court struck down some retroactive statutes as
violating the Due Process Clause. In Nichols v. Coolidge,32 the Court
struck down a statute that taxed property conveyed before the statute
was enacted.' The Court relied on earlier cases, including Brushaber,
which stated that a retroactive tax statute may be "so arbitrary and
capricious as to amount to confiscation and offend the Fifth Amendment."' In Blodgett v. Holden, 5 the Court used this same "arbitrary
and capricious" language in striking down the retroactive application of
a gift tax. 6 The Court focused on the lack of notice of the taxpayer as

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1.
Id. amend. V.
Id.
87 U.S. 323 (1874).
Id. at 333.
240 U.S. 1 (1916).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36,

Id. at 20.
Id. at 24.
274 U.S. 531 (1927).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 542.
275 U.S. 142 (1927).
Id. at 147.
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to the retroactivity of the tax, stating the taxpayer acted "in entire good
faith and without the slightest premonition of such consequence."3 7 In
Untermyer v. Anderson," the Court again struck down the application
of a gift tax to gifts made during the prior year.39 The gift was made
while Congress was considering the statute in question.40 Nonetheless,
the Court held the statute to be "arbitrary and invalid under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment."4 1 The Court required actual
notice to the taxpayer of his tax liability.4 The Court stated "[tihe
taxpayer may justly demand to know when and how he becomes liable
for taxes."4 3 Other cases interpreted a statute to not apply to the
taxpayers retroactively to avoid holding the statute unconstitutional."
The Court's early interpretations of retroactive gift and estate tax
statutes dealt with a "wholly new tax." Thus, the courts primarily
focused on the taxpayer's lack of notice as to future new tax laws in
finding their retroactive application "arbitrary and capricious." As gift
and estate tax laws became commonplace, the Court abandoned its
reliance on the "actual notice" test and struck down only those retroactive statutes that were "harsh and oppressive." In Welch v. Henry,48
the Court upheld a retroactive tax on dividends received some two years
earlier.4" The Court articulated a test to determine whether a retroactive tax is unconstitutional: "In each case it is necessary to consider the
nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid before it can
be said that its retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to
transgress the constitutional limitation." 7 The Court further explained
that actual or constructive notice and timing were the most important
circumstances to consider.48 In Estate of Ekins v. Commissioner,9 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals used this Welch "harsh and oppressive"
standard to uphold the retroactive application of a tax on the value of an
insurance policy in the decedent's estate.60 The court focused primarily
on the circumstance of the tax, which the court considered to be merely

37.
38,
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
276 U.S. 440 (1928).
Id. at 445.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93 (1935); White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98 (1935).
305 U.S. 134 (1938).
Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148.

49. 797 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1986).
50. Id. at 485.
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a change in an existing tax. 1 Thus, the court held the taxpayer had
"constructive notice" of the retroactive statute because life insurance
policies historically were included under estate taxes.52 Unlike the
earlier cases, the court did not address or consider the taxpayer's actual
expectations. The Seventh Circuit also employed this type of analysis
in Reed v.United States.53 In Reed the court focused on the nature of
the tax, which it characterized as a mere change in an existing tax, to
uphold the retroactive elimination of an estate tax exclusion for gifts
made within three years of death." Rejecting the actual notice test of
the earlier cases, the court held the decedent had "constructive notice"
that at least part of the gift would be taxed.55 The court did not find
that changing this existing tax was "so harsh or oppressive as to be
invalid."' The Supreme Court has also relied on the Welch "harsh and
oppressive" standard, focusing on the characterization or nature of the
tax. In United States v. Darusmont,7 the Court upheld retroactive
application of an income tax statute to the entire calendar year in which
enactment took place.' The Court held that the statute in question did
not create a "new tax."59 In addition, according to the Court, the
taxpayer had "ample advance notice of the increase in the effective
minimum rate."6' Thus, the tax was not so "harsh and oppressive as
to be a denial of due process."6 1 In United States v. Hemme,62 the
Court again focused on the nature of the tax in upholding the retroactive
application of gift and estate statutes.63 The Court found that the
taxpayers were no worse off than they would have been without the
enactment of the new statute." Thus, the Court reversed the district
court, which had held that the statute was "arbitrary and capricious,"
relying on Untermyer.? The Court distinguished Untermyer and used
the Welch test to hold that the statute was not "so oppressive as to

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 484.
Id. at 485.
743 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 486 n.4.
Id. at 485.
449 U.S. 292 (1981).
Id. at 297.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 300.
Id. at 299.
Id.
476 U.S. 558 (1986).
Id. at 559.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 564.
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transgress the constitutional limitation."66 In Milliken v. United
States, 7 the Court again distinguished the earlier line of cases applying
the actual notice test." In Milliken the Court upheld the retroactive
taxing of gifts made before the statute was passed.69 "[Ilt does not
suffice to say that the gift antedated the statute. It is necessary to
consider the nature of the tax and of the decedent's gift."7 0 In considering those circumstances, the Court found that the tax was not a "wholly
new tax" but merely a change in the tax rate and therefore not
unconstitutional. 71 Indeed, the Court stated that the taxpayer "should
72
be regarded as taking his chances of any increases in the tax burden."
The cases applying the "harsh and oppressive" test of Welch upheld the
retroactive statutes, usually characterizing them as a "change in the tax
rate" as opposed to a "wholly new tax." In addition, the Court emphasized that actual notice was not required, pointing out that constructive
notice was usually present because the federal government has
retroactively changed tax statutes in the past. For the past sixty years,
the Welch standard was the predominate test used to uphold retroactive
tax legislation. However, in a few cases the Court framed the test
slightly different. One such case is Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.
R.A. Gray & Co. 7 ' There, the Court focused on legislative intent,
instead of parties' expectations or the nature of the tax, in upholding
retroactive application of provisions governing the withdrawal from
employer pension plans. 74 The Court stated that due process is met by
"showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself
justified by a rational legislative purpose." 75 This is the test typically
used to evaluate economic legislation.7 6 It focuses on the intent of the
enacting legislature, rather than the "nature and circumstances" of the
statute as proscribed by the Welch standard. 77 This test had not been
previously applied to tax statutes, but the Court considered the test to
be similar to the "harsh and oppressive" test from Welch.76 Most
recently, this formulation was used by the Ninth Circuit Court of
66. Id. at 568-69.
67,
68,
69.
70,

283 U.S. 15,(1931).
Id, at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id,

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 23.
467 U.S. 717 (1984).
Id. at 730.
Id.
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Pension Benefit Guaranty, 467 U.S. at 732.
Id. at 733.
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Appeals in Licari v. Commissioner79 to uphold a retroactive tax statute
that increased the penalty for taxpayer's understatement of tax
liability 0 The court in Licari applied both the Welch test and the
legitimate legislative purpose test of Pension Guaranty."' First, the
court looked at the nature of the tax and held that the statute in
question was a "penalty," not a tax. 2 In addition, the statute merely
8 3
increased the rate or percentage of the penalty.
Second, the court
used the Pension Guaranty test, focusing on the legislature's intent, to
uphold the retroactive application of the increased penalty." Noting
that legislation that adjusts economic burdens and benefits is entitled
to a "presumption of constitutionality," the court held that the statute
in question fell within that category of legislation. 5 Thus, the court
found that the statute was not "harsh and oppressive" and further that
it was "rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.'
As the
decision in Licari demonstrated, the courts were uncertain as to the due
process standard to be applied to tax statutes with retroactive effect.
In Carlton v. United States, 7 the Court began its analysis by stating
that retroactive tax laws have historically been upheld. s The Court
explained that the Welch "harsh and oppressive" standard is really the
same as applied to other economic legislation." According to the Court,
the test is whether "the retroactive application of a statute is supported
by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means."90 This
formulation of the test was then applied to Carlton's actions and the
statute in question. The Court found that the purpose of the amendment was not illegitimate or arbitrary."' The Court felt Congress was
"correcting a mistake. 2 This was supported by the legislative history
and the dramatic increase in the amount of predicted revenue loss.93

79.
80.
81.
82.

946 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 694-95.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 694.

83. Id.
84.
85.

Id. at 694-95.
Id. at 694.

86. Id. at 695.
87,
88.
89.
90.
91.

114 S. Ct. at 2018.
Id. at 2021.
Id. at 2022.
Id.
Id. at 2023.

92. Id.
93.

Id. The Court noted that without the revised provision of the statute, the predicted

revenue loss would increase from approximately $300 million to $7 billion during a fiveyear period. Id.
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In addition, there was no evidence of an improper motive on Congress'
behalf to target estates for additional taxes." The Court also pointed
out the amendment was enacted quickly and the period of retroactivity
was only slighter greater than one year.95 Rejecting the rationale used
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court stated that proof of reliance by the taxpayer is
"insufficient to establish a constitutional violation."6 "Tax legislation
is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested rights in the Internal
Revenue Code."97 Rejecting the taxpayer's detrimental reliance policy
argument, the Court stated that principle is not limited to retroactive
statutes." According to the Court, individuals may rely upon future
expectations that are disturbed by prospective legislation." Carlton's
lack of notice was also not dispositive.'00 Citing Milliken, the Court
essentially held that a taxpayer pays his money and takes his chances. 1 ' Finally, the Court held that the Nichols era "actual notice" cases
relied on by the court of appeals have limited precedential value,
primarily because "exacting review of economic legislation" has been
discarded and discredited."0 ' Moreover, according to the Court, those
cases are distinguishable because they dealt with a "wholly new tax,"
rather than changes in an existing tax.'O$ This was similar to the4
reasoning employed by the district court in upholding the statute.'0
Because of these factors, the Court found that the court of appeals held
the amendment to an unduly strict standard.' 5 Instead, the Court
looked to the legislative intent and concluded that the retroactive
application of the amendment is rationally related to a legitimate

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2024.
97. Id. at 2023.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. According to the Court, "a taxpayer 'should be regarded as taking his chances
of any increase in the tax burden which might result from carrying out the established
policy of taxation.'" Id. (citing Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. at 23).
102. Id. The court relied on Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963), where the
Court stated "[t]he doctrine ... that due process authorizes courts to hold laws
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely has long since been
discarded."
103. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2024.'
104. See supra notes 16-18 for a discussion of the district court's analysis.
105. Carlton, 114 U.S. at 2024.
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did not violate
legislative purpose. 0 6 Therefore, the amendment
10 7
Carlton's rights under the Due Process Clause.
The holding in Carlton is not limited to section 2057. Instead, the
Court announced a new due process standard for evaluating tax statutes
with a retroactive effect, which is the same standard used for retroactive
economic legislation-there must be a legitimate legislative purpose
furthered by rational means. Is there any scrutiny or judicial review of
retroactive tax laws left after Carlton? A tax statute would presumably
always satisfy the Court's "low scrutiny" due process test, since all tax
statutes are for the "legitimate purpose" of generating revenue and
retroactive taxation is rationally related to that purpose. Indeed, the
Court distinguished or discredited the few older cases that did invalidate
retroactive tax statutes. Thus, it appears that taxpayers can not rely on
the Due Process Clause to protect them from retroactive tax legislation.
In fact, this is exactly what Scalia argued for in his concurrence: "I
welcome this recognition that the Due Process Clause does not prevent
retroactive taxes, since I believe that the Due Process Clause guarantees
no substantive rights, but only (as it says) process."0" However, this
lack of protection has some alarming implications. Taxpayers will be
unable to rely on existing tax laws, undermining the public's confidence
in the federal government. In addition, tax decisionmakers must try to
predict what future statutory changes could be applied retroactively.
Could professional tax advisers be held liable for failing to notify their
clients of potential retroactive changes? Given the many changes to the
Internal Revenue Code and the complexities of the issues involved, tax
adviser liability is a real possibility for the adviser who does not fulfill
his obligation to keep abreast of not only the changes in the Code, but
the potential future changes that could be applied retroactively. As the
Court stated in Carlton, "a taxpayer should be regarded as taking his
chances of any increase in the tax burden.""0 9 To prevent the taxpayer
from losing at the IRS gambling casino, the Court should have continued
to apply the Welch standard to retroactive tax legislation. While the
"harsh and oppressive" test was by no means a black letter standard, the
emphasis was properly placed on the nature and circumstances of the
tax and its impact on the taxpayer, instead of speculating as to the
legislators' motives in passing the statute. Use of the Welch test would
have avoided the unjust result that occurred in this case. "Retroactively
disallowing the tax benefit that the earlier law offered, without

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2027 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 2023.
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compensating those who incurred expenses in accepting that offer, seems
to me harsh and oppressive by any normal measure."10
STEWART HASKINS

110, Id. at 2027 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

